FROM THE STREETS TO THE MOUNTAINS: THE DYNAMICS OF TRANSITION FROM A PROTEST WAVE TO AN INSURGENCY IN KASHMIR[*]

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This study investigates the dynamics of transition from a peaceful protest wave to a violent insurgency. It examines the causal path leading to a major shift in the intensity of a protest wave and argues that the transition is the product of the interactions between the dissidents, the state, and external actors. By studying the protest wave in Kashmir (1979-88), it identifies state repression and external support as the key factors driving the transition process. Time series analysis is used to analyze the original empirical evidence collected through content analysis. By providing a comprehensive understanding of the origins of the insurgency in Kashmir, this study shows that protest waves and civil wars are intimately linked.

In December 2010, the self-immolation of a man in Tunisia triggered pro-democracy protests throughout the Arab world, leading to the mobilization of thousands of people against authoritarian regimes in the Middle East. While some of these protests were quelled, others succeeded in bringing on regime change; and some, such as those in Libya and Syria, transformed into civil wars.

Libya and Syria are among a host of civil war cases that initially began as protest waves. For instance, the civil wars in Guatemala (1960-96), Nicaragua (1978-90), and El Salvador (1981-92) each evolved from widespread demonstrations and strikes (Almeida 2008; Brockett 2005; Lichbach, Davenport, and Armstrong 2003). In these cases, two forms of contention, protest waves and civil wars, were intimately connected. The question then becomes: what links these two? I maintain that protest waves and civil wars are linked by a dynamic process that is a product of the interactions between the dissidents, the state, and external actors.

Even though several studies have noted the connection between protest waves and civil wars (Lichbach et al. 2003; Tarrow 2007), the determinants of transition are unclear. I argue that when the extremist wing of a protest wave gains support, it steers protest activity toward violent forms of collective action. As protest waves emerge and spread, nongovernmental groups mobilize and compete against each other for recruits and resources, ratcheting up the willingness of groups to embrace more extreme strategies involving violence (Tarrow 1989). The potential for transition to a civil war increases when governments use force to repress the dissidents. Ineffective or indiscriminate governmental repression can have disastrous effects, leading to a spiral of conflict as protesters supplant nonviolent dissent with more violent forms (Lichbach 1987; Opp and Roehl 1990; White 1989). Meanwhile, foreign financial and military support to the rebels can dramatically increase dissident capabilities, thus elevating conflict intensity (Salehyan 2009; Gleditsch 2007). Therefore, I argue that the transition to civil war happens when radical groups begin to take control of the protest wave, shifting to predominantly violent tactics.

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This combination of state repression and external support has been at the core of several cases. In El Salvador, the harsh repression by the state is widely noted (Brockett 2005; Almeida 2008). The external support provided by Nicaragua and other communist regimes in the early 1980s enabled the dissidents to arm their rebel forces and launch offensive strikes against the state (Brockett 2005). More recently, the protests in Syria against the Assad regime escalated to an insurgency as the protesters began receiving funding from the Syrian diaspora, wealthy Sunni Muslims, and sympathetic governments, including Saudi Arabia and Qatar (*The Economist* 2012).

Using Tarrow's (1989, 1998) waves of contention framework, I study the dynamics of transition from the protest wave of the mid-1980s in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir (hereafter, Kashmir) to an insurgency in 1988. Insurgency, a type of civil war, is characterized by a power asymmetry between the insurgents and the government forces in which the rebels typically lack sufficient military capabilities to confront the government forces directly (Kalyvas 2005). By focusing on the interactions between the dissidents, the state, and external actors, I demonstrate how the shift from a predominantly nonviolent form of contention to a violent one occurred in Kashmir. A protest wave that started out as mostly street demonstrations evolved into an insurgency in which rebels ambushed government forces and bombed buildings.

A defining facet of the transition process examined in this study is endogenous causation, which refers to the high degree of interdependence between the actions and responses of the actors (Beissinger 2011). The state's attempts to crush the protesters in Kashmir, the radicals' actions in the face of repression, and Pakistani support to the dissidents all interacted to create an escalatory dynamic. This ongoing process of tactical interaction, in which the dissidents and the state try to offset each other's moves (McAdam 1983), is shaped more by these dynamics than by structural conditions.

The theoretical contributions of this study are threefold. First, it represents the first effort to focus precisely on the dynamics of the transition from a nonviolent form of contention into a violent one—something that earlier works on contentious politics have largely neglected. Second, it makes the theoretical case that two types of political contention, protest waves and insurgencies, are inherently linked. Political scientists and sociologists have typically approached these two phenomena as relatively distinct (Tarrow 2007). For instance, Kalyvas (2006) maintains that protests and civil war dynamics are separate, as contentious politics are characterized by the monopoly of violence by the state while civil war takes place in the absence of such a monopoly. Nonetheless, this study shows that similar factors occur in protest waves and insurgencies and that each can be seen as different phases of a larger episode of a conflict (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001; Tarrow 2007; Tilly and Tarrow 2007). Finally, this study modifies Tarrow's (1989, 1998) waves of contention framework to include the possibility of transition into an insurgency. In Tarrow's model, protest waves exhibit a parabolic trajectory, characterized by a regular rise in protest activity followed by declining activity in the demobilization phase (Tarrow 1989). This study shows that in some situations nonviolent contentious activity can evolve into an insurgency without entering a demobilization phase.

Overall, the empirical findings demonstrate that the main driving force of the transition to civil war in Kashmir is the state's indiscriminate and direct repressive tactics combined with the support the dissidents received from Pakistan. When the state repressed the nonviolent protesters, Pakistan provided substantive support to the radicals, enabling them to organize violent attacks against the state. As collective action turned more violent, the state continued to repress the dissidents, further fueling violent collective action, transforming a nonviolent protest wave to an insurgency.

WHY KASHMIR?

Kashmir provides a unique opportunity for studying the dynamics of the transition process for three main reasons. First, Kashmir is an interesting deviant case because repression not only failed to demobilize the protest wave, but also contributed to the shift from nonviolent protests to an insurgency. This outcome is highly unusual, as most states that are willing to repress, and have the capabilities to do so, usually succeed in demobilizing popular contention (Brockett 2005). Moreover, the transition process in Kashmir demonstrates that insurgencies do not only occur out of static conditions, as many structural approaches in the civil war literature suggest (Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Fearon and Laitin 2003), but can also evolve as a result of a sequence of political interactions between the dissidents and the state (Lichbach et al. 2003). By using fine-grained data, I show the dynamics of this process in Kashmir.[1]

Second, the stages of transition to an insurgency are easily identifiable in the Kashmiri case. As figure 1 illustrates, the protest wave first started in mid-1980 as residents protested against the government's poor performance in Kashmir. Kashmiris were dissatisfied over a number of issues dealing with limited employment opportunities, a lack of economic development, corruption, and nepotism. Moreover, increased literacy and the expansion of mass media had produced a generation of politically aware Kashmiris. Without adequate institutional channels to express their discontent, this new generation of Kashmiri Muslims began to protest in the streets, raising slogans often intermingled with Islamic fundamentalism and secessionist sentiments (Ganguly 1997). Initially, the dissidents were loosely organized, and collective action remained at low levels until it suddenly began to expand in 1984. In mid-1986, protesters dramatically increased their activities, mostly using nonviolent tactics. Over the course of the protest wave, however, the protesters' initial strategy of expressing discontent became more violent as they broadened their goals to pursue Kashmiri independence.

Figure 1. Protest Wave in Kashmir (1979-88)

The State Assembly elections held in March 1987 marked a turning point in the scale of violence. The National Conference and Congress (I) ran as an alliance against the Muslim United Front (MUF), a coalition of Islamic parties including *Jamaat-e Islami, Ummat-e Islami*, and the *Anjuman-e Ittehad-ul Muslimeen* (Swami 2007). The National Conference-Congress (I) alliance won the majority of the seats, but the elections were deeply flawed as a result of voter intimidation and electoral fraud. The Islamic wing, therefore, concluded that there was no possibility for it to come to power through democratic means (Ganguly 1997). After 1987, the dissidents' tactics turned more radical. As figure 1 shows, the intensity of political contention began to rise consistently starting in mid-1988, marking the beginning of the insurgency as the Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) solidified its power and engaged in violent tactics against the state in pursuit of secessionist goals. These clear demar- cations of the expansion and transition phases of contention allow for the examination of the transition from a protest wave to an insurgency.

Finally, Kashmir is an important case because foreign actors played a key role in the transition to insurgency. In this case, Pakistan's support to Kashmiri dissidents had an impor- tant effect on the dynamics of the protest wave. Since a majority of the literature on con- tentious politics focuses on internal or domestic dynamics (Tarrow 1989; Tilly 1978; Tilly and Tarrow 2007), the potential impact of foreign actors is frequently overlooked. Several studies of civil war onset, however, have found that external support can play an important role in the outbreak of an armed conflict (Gleditsch 2007; Salehyan 2009). Hence, Kashmir is an ideal case to examine two processes of protest wave formation and insurgency formation, and to determine the relative importance of external support to the dissidents in comparison to other domestic factors, such as state repression.

DEFINING PROTEST WAVE AND INSURGENCY

The delineation of conceptual boundaries between a protest wave and an insurgency is important because a theory of transition has to capture the moment when the shift from one to the other occurs. I maintain that a protest wave and an insurgency are different ways for groups to engage in collective action, and are situated along a continuum of contentious politics. In both forms of conflict, actors coordinate their efforts to pursue their claims, influ- encing the behavior of other actors as well as the government. Yet, clear analytical differences between a protest wave and an insurgency can be identified mainly via the groups' selection of *tactics*. Thus, I define a protest wave as *a series of interactions that extend over a long period of time in which actors take collective action against the state in pursuit of collective goals by using predominantly nonviolent tactics.*[2] The employment of violent tactics does not lie at the core of protest waves and, indeed, often signals their decline (della Porta and Tarrow 1986). So, on the contentious politics spectrum, a protest wave is situated toward the nonviolent end. Dissidents typically resort to demonstrations, boycotts, strikes, or sit-ins to raise their challenges against the state. Protestors' goals are often nonrevolutionary, although several protest waves have pursued revolutionary goals and led to regime changes, such as the demonstrations in Leipzig in the former German Democratic Republic in 1989 or the recent revolutionary movements in Egypt and Tunisia. In protest waves, mass protests involve the participation of various sectors of the society, such as students and workers, who are mostly peaceful and unarmed. Conversely, insurgency is a type of a civil war. Insurgency refers to an *armed conflict within the boundaries of a recognized sovereign state, which takes place between the government and parties seeking to replace it or secede from it, and is conducted by irregular forces engaging in guerrilla tactics.* In insurgencies, the rebels target the state militarily. Nonetheless, they lack the capabilities to engage in conventional warfare and, therefore, attack vulnerable police and military targets or ambush military units, thus avoiding large-scale direct clashes with a conventionally organized government force (Snow

1996). It is the power asymmetry between the state and its challengers that defines the types of tactics used throughout an insurgency (Kalyvas 2005). Insurgents usually operate in rural areas where they enjoy popular support and where state forces find it difficult to penetrate effectively (Snow 1996). They challenge the state by organizing military ambushes, bomb explosions, arson, and limited armed clashes with security forces. In short, violence is a central part of contention in insurgencies. Thus, an insurgency is located toward the violent end of the contentious politics spectrum.

DYNAMICS OF PROTEST WAVES: TARROW'S MODEL

Tarrow's (1989, 1998) protest wave model comprises two phases: expansion and contraction. Accordingly, protest waves begin when the political environment provides incentives for collective action. Throughout this initial phase, existing organizations initiate protest activity by utilizing conventional repertoires of contention, including demonstrations and strikes. The diffusion of protests to different sectors and locations leads to more frequent and widespread protests. Established groups, such as trade unions, monopolize the use of conventional repertoires as they enter the wave, pushing new groups that are trying to differentiate themselves from established organizations to resort to more confrontational tactics (Tarrow 1989). In particular, small organizations with extremist agendas turn to more radical and violent forms of contentious action. Ironically, the protest wave begins to contract when it appears to be strongest (della Porta and Tarrow 1986). Once protest activity has expanded, people become weary of protesting. Protests start to decelerate as participation and the frequency of events declines. Group competition for mass support also leads to polarization between the moderate and radical factions. While moderate groups opt for peaceful forms of contention through institutional channels such as forming political parties, radical groups continue to confront the state through violent means. Eventually, the protest wave ends as the radicals either lose mass support or continue to challenge the state by engaging in clandestine activities, even as mass protests wither.

   Several studies have found more diverse outcomes for protest waves than simply de-escalation. For instance, Beissinger (2002) examines the protest wave leading to the disintegration of the Soviet Union, while Almeida (2008) focuses on the contentious activities in El Salvador that turned into a civil war in the early 1980s. Both studies show that protests can evolve into more intense forms of conflict depending upon the political opportunity structures, institutional constraints, levels of state repression and, in Beissinger's case, the momentum created by the initial protests. This study also questions the inevitability of de-escalation but differs from these studies in three major ways. First, it focuses on a particular segment of a contentious wave where nonviolent protests have already expanded and tactics are becoming violent, instead of examining the entire wave structure starting from its origins and the expansion of nonviolent protests all the way to the end of the civil war. Second, while these two studies refer to accommodation and repression within larger contexts of political opportunity and threat, I highlight the importance of the day-to-day interactions of the state and the dissidents. Finally, I also examine the effects of foreign actors on the transition process.

   An important element of Tarrow's model is the timing of contention. Actors' responses to external conditions and to each other depend heavily upon the phase of the protest wave. In this study, timing is crucial for analyzing the transition to an insurgency, because the shift in conflict intensity happens when protest activity has expanded but has not entered the contraction phase. Thus, I test my hypotheses through the expansion phase of the protest wave into the formation of the insurgency (figure 2).

Figure 2: Transition from Protest Wave to Insurgency

Protest Wave

DYNAMICS OF TRANSITION FROM PROTEST WAVE TO INSURGENCY

I argue that both state repression and external support lead to the transition from a protest wave to an insurgency. When a protest wave is already in its expansion phase and protests have accelerated, meaning that nonviolent contention has diffused across various sectors in the society and has increased in frequency, repression is likely to drive the dissidents to shift from nonviolent to violent tactics. The interjection of external support enables the dissidents to gain the military means necessary to engage in guerrilla tactics and take the protest wave in the direction of an insurgency. While the fueling effects of repression are well studied in the literature, most of these arguments pertain to a protest wave (Francisco 1995; Granovetter 1978; Khawaja 1993; Rasler 1996). In the following sections, I examine how repression influences the shift from nonviolent to violent tactics during the expansion phase of a protest wave, and how external support facilitates this shift by preventing the protest wave from entering the contraction phase.

State Repression

While Tarrow (1989, 1998) associates repression with the downswing phase of the protest wave, other studies have shown that repression can accelerate the protest wave during the expansion phase by creating a backlash effect (Francisco 1995; Rasler 1996; Brockett 2005). Brockett (2005) claims that when a protest wave is under way, the state usually increases repression gradually, leading to elevated levels of contentious activities, new grievances and intensified desire for revenge and justice. Even though the backlash effect explains the acceleration of protests, it fails to address how the shift from a protest wave to an insurgency occurs.

I maintain that substitution models (Lichbach 1987; Moore 1998) provide the most applicable theoretical foundation to understand how the protest wave evolves to an insurgency. According to Lichbach (1987), protesters modify their tactics based on cost-benefit calculations. When the state represses nonviolent protests and increases the cost of nonviolent

collective action, the rebels switch to violent tactics. Furthermore, micromobilization models suggest that even if repression initially deters protests by imposing costs on collective action, its deterrent effect is neutralized, or even reversed, if people are directly exposed to repression and are members of informal associations such as unions, opposition groups, or churches that are supportive of protests (McAdam 1988; Opp and Roehl 1990; White 1989). For people to engage in political violence, they must perceive repression to be illegitimate and expect others to do so (White 1989). Yet, the shift in support for political violence may not happen immediately. Micromobilization processes might take some time, as people meet and interact with others who believe in the utility of political violence. Therefore, repression might have a lasting effect on increased levels of conflict intensity.

While repression is likely to play a significant role in the transition to an insurgency, treating repression as a general category of state response risks overgeneralization. States choose from a variety of tactics to respond to dissent. The effects of different types of repression might vary and, therefore, influence conflict dynamics in diverse ways. For instance, Tilly (1978) maintains that governments use repressive measures such as suspending newspapers or forbidding assemblies to raise the cost of organization, while they use other measures like setting up barricades during protests to directly raise the cost of collective action. In this regard, Koopmans (1997) offers a useful categorization based on the consistency, legitimacy, and aim of repressive actions. Accordingly, institutional repression represents "formal, more general, less direct, and usually legally sanctioned repressive measures taken by higher-level authorities," whereas situational repression consists of "informal actions of lower-level state agents, most importantly the police, who in direct contact with protestors apply repression in a relatively spontaneous, ad-hoc manner" (Koopmans 1997: 153-54). Institutional repression targets the mobilizing structures of the rebel groups and is typically predictable, consistent, and seen as legitimate. Conversely, situational repression targets collective action directly and is more inconsistent.

Following Koopmans, to investigate the shift from nonviolent to violent tactics I categorize the state's repressive actions into three distinct types: *preventive repression, reactionary repression*, and *arrests*. These categories encompass the repressive tactics states use during the expansion phase of a protest wave when contention accelerates. Preventive and reactionary types of repression largely correspond to Koopmans's institutional and situational repression categories, respectively, with the caveat that my category of reactionary repression includes an element of indiscriminate violence. Arguably, the likelihood of indiscriminate violence is higher in reactionary repression as the state cannot always easily identify and punish the dissidents. If, for instance, the police have a hard time controlling an unruly crowd, the chances of the police teargassing people indiscriminately are relatively high. Moreover, as the state resorts to greater repression to suppress the dissidents at the peak of the protest wave (Brockett 2005), the risk of the police using excessive force is particularly high. In contrast, in preventive repression, the state uses repression without directly engaging civilians. So, when curtailing the civil liberties of its citizens, the state does not come into direct contact with any of the protesters and, therefore, avoids indiscriminate violence. Finally, I create an "arrest" category, as arrests can be sanctioned by both higher and lower-level authorities and, thus, can be difficult to categorize as either preventive or reactionary repression.

I expect reactionary repression and arrests to have two outcomes for the transition of a protest wave to an insurgency: (1) they will have immediate positive effects on the shift from nonviolent to violent actions; and (2) they will also have longer-lasting positive effects, which continue for several days to allow for micromobilization process to take place. The exact duration of the impact is calculated in the analysis section. As substitution models suggest, when protest activity has accelerated in the expansion phase, the state's reactionary repressive actions will increase the costs of protest and lead to the substitution of nonviolent with violent tactics. I expect reactionary repression to have a lasting positive effect on the transition to insurgency as a result of the micromobilization process. People are more likely to perceive

indiscriminate repression involving violence to be illegitimate (Goodwin 2001). The negative sentiments caused by the state's violent acts will only get reinforced as people come together in various venues and share their experiences. Eventually, more people will be convinced that violence is the only viable option left to either change the political system or to secede.

Arrests should also have a positive impact on the shift to violent tactics, because arrests impose costs on nonviolent tactics. Moreover, people who are arrested, as well as their close family and friends, can be motivated to use violence for extremist goals if they perceive the arrests to be illegitimate. Again, through the micromobilization process, arrests will likely have a lasting positive impact on the transition to insurgency.

In contrast, preventive repression is likely to reduce the risk of transition because it is consistent. By targeting the mobilizing structures of dissidents, this type of repression imposes costs on contention and makes the shift from nonviolent to violent contentious tactics more difficult (Goodwin 2001). If preventive repression successfully inhibits the momentum created by the protest expansion, then the radical wing will be unable to gain strength. Since preventive repression will likely be perceived as more legitimate, it will be harder to convince people that political violence is the only option left. Once the momentum of the protest wave is lost and the radicals are unable to gain control, protests will decelerate without turning violent. So, I expect preventive repression to have negative immediate and lasting effects on the chances of a protest wave transitioning to an insurgency.

State Accommodation

Accommodation refers to state actions that lower the cost of collective action (Tilly 1978). Several studies on accommodation have highlighted its positive, negative, or non-impact on protest activity (Inclán 2009; Oberschall 1994; Rasler 1996; Tarrow 1998). It remains unclear if state accommodation fuels protest and encourages violent tactics, or if it leads to demobilization by creating a split between the radicals and the moderates. Following Tarrow (1989), I argue that the state's accommodative actions, such as initiating negotiations, will have a negative effect on the transition to an insurgency. When the state accommodates nonviolent protesters before the radical wing has gained strength, protesters will be unwilling to shift to violence. Violent tactics typically lead to harsh government repression and therefore are costly. So, the protesters will be reluctant to switch to a more costly option (Shellman 2006). When the government makes concessions, the protesters will be reluctant to side with the radical wing and engage in political violence. Thus, I expect to see both immediate and lasting negative effects of the state's accommodative actions on transitioning to insurgency.

External Support

According to McCarthy and Zald (1977), resources provided by external actors are crucial in facilitating mobilization against the state. For dissidents to shift to insurgent tactics after protests have accelerated, they need to secure resources to attain sufficient military capabilities. These can be hard to acquire, particularly because the state has greater coercive power and enjoys the ability to impose restrictions on the dissidents' attempts to mobilize. Therefore, groups often turn to outsiders to enhance their capabilities to fight (Heraclides 1990). Moreover, an endorsement of radical activities by foreign governments can create a vital political opportunity for the insurgents (Tarrow, 1998).

I expect external support to have a positive impact on the transition of a protest wave to an insurgency by increasing the radical groups' capabilities and providing them the opportunity to engage in violent tactics successfully. Studies on external support suggest that providing safe havens, military training and equipment, financial support, and even political or diplomatic support can greatly enhance the capabilities of extremists (Gleditsch 2007; Salehyan 2009; Heraclides 1990). Furthermore, if radicals convey to their fellow protesters

Table 1. Summary of Hypotheses

Variable	Direction of Expected Effects	
	Immediate	*Lasting*
Reactionary Repression	+	+
Arrests	+	+
Preventive Repression	-	-
Accommodation	-	-
External Support	+	+

that they can potentially succeed, more people will join them (Klandermans 1984). Even political support from a foreign government can boost support for the rebels (Thyne 2006). External support is likely to have both immediate and lasting effects. While certain types of external support, such as the provision of arms or financial support, might immediately effect the transition, the provision of safe havens or military training might take effect more slowly. Thus, I expect external support to have positive contemporaneous and lasting impacts on the transition of a protest wave to an insurgency. All hypotheses tested in this study are summarized in table 1.

RESEARCH DESIGN

My analysis is based on data collected from the national daily newspaper *The Indian Express* from January 1, 1979 through December 31, 1988. Repressive and accommodative state actions, contentious and accommodative dissident actions, and actions of the external actors were coded for date, actor, location, target, number of participants, number of injured and number of deaths. The exact date, actor, and the type of action had to be clear to be included in the dataset. The remaining categories were coded as long as the information was provided in the report. In total, 3,363 events were hand-coded by the author. All events were then weighted based on Krain's (2000) scale, ranging from 1 to 25. Finally, the data were aggregated in daily intervals.[3]

As the dataset is based on a single newspaper, two issues are likely to challenge its validity: underrepresentation of the frequency of the actual events and selection bias. In terms of underrepresentation, *The Indian Express* had correspondents based in Kashmir throughout the protest wave who reported directly from the area. Therefore, the newspaper provided detailed information regarding a wide range of collective actions as the events unfolded, reducing the chance of underrepresentation. Because my data show trends that are similar to those identified by scholars who have studied the protest waves in Kashmir in detail (Ganguly 1997; Schofield 2003), concerns for the dataset's validity are somewhat minimized. Nonetheless, it is challenging to capture the extent of external support through newspaper data, as such information is typically covert and not frequently picked up by media reports. Hence, external support is coded conservatively in that positive codings are only given when militants are arrested crossing the border, when they are captured with Pakistani weapons, or when officials publicly express support for the militants. The possible underrepresentation of external support potentially leads to uncertainty about the effect of this factor. As for the issue of selection bias, the longitudinal design of the study potentially reduces challenges to external and internal validity. The data may be affected by this problem throughout the entire course of the conflict in the same way because the data all originate from the same source. [4]

The Dependent Variable

The dependent variable is *conflict intensity,* which is measured as the logit transformation of the ratio of the daily scores of violent collective action to total collective action (violent and nonviolent).[5] The dependent variable varies based on whether the collective actions are mainly nonviolent, as is usually the case with protest waves, or primarily violent, as in insurgencies. Thus, the minimum values of conflict intensity reflect days when collective actions such as organizing meetings, violations of curfew, and nonviolent strikes and demonstrations, which are typically found in protest waves, occur. The maximum values of conflict intensity, on the other hand, reflect days when actions such as clashes, abductions and executions, armed attacks, and bombings—actions that I expect to observe in insurgencies— take place.[6]

The Independent Variables

Reactionary Repression: This variable is measured as the total daily score of repressive actions of lower-level authorities directly confronting the dissidents. Reactionary repression includes the violent or nonviolent putdown of demonstrations, beating up dissidents, armed attacks, as well as bombings or burning houses and villages.[7]

Arrests: This variable consists of the total daily scores of arrests of protesters and opposition leaders in relation to collective action.

Preventive Repression: Preventive repression consists of the total daily scores of repressive events sanctioned by higher-level authorities. This variable includes restriction of civil rights and liberties, seizing assets, setting up special courts, imposing curfews, and declaring martial law.

State Accommodation: This is measured as the total daily score of state concessions. It includes initiating negotiations, removing restrictive laws and regulations, granting amnesty, withdrawing the army, and incorporating the opposition into the government.

External Support: External support is measured as the total daily score of all the support extremist groups received from foreign actors. Various forms of diplomatic, humanitarian, and material support—including supportive expressions in the international arena, granting asylum to dissidents, and providing sanctuary, training, financial support or arms—are events that are included to generate this variable.

Elections: I control for the effect of elections on conflict intensity. According to Tilly (1978), collective action increases around elections, as the electoral process itself provides opportunities for the formation of new associations or the inclusion of previously excluded groups in the political system. Elections can also affect conflict intensity through sharpening ethnic divisions (Snyder 2000) or if they are or are suspected to be fraudulent (McAdam and Tarrow 2010). The election variable is a dummy variable coded 1 for two months before and after the elections were held.[8]

Estimation: Single Error Correction Model

To examine the transition from protest to insurgency, I estimate a single-equation error correction model (ECM), which directly estimates the rate at which the dependent variable returns to equilibrium when a change occurs in the independent variable(s) (De Boef and Keele 2008). Utilizing an ECM is appropriate for three major reasons. First, the model is dynamic and accounts for past influences on future values. The model assumes that the values at time *t-1* are related to the values at time *t*, which are then related to the values at time *t+1*. This assumption of dependence between the values of the variables and their lagged values allows for testing the effects of the explanatory variables on the dependent variable over time. Furthermore, an ECM enables me to test for both the immediate and longer-term effects of the explanatory variables on the dependent variable (De Boef and Keele 2008). The immediate or

short-term effect refers to the influence of an independent variable which does not persist into the future, or the effect of a unit change in X_t on Y_t at time t. The longer-term effect refers to the continuous impact of an independent variable over some number of time periods. The effect of X on Y persists into the future but decays over time. So, its impact at time *t+3* will be smaller than its effect at time *t+2*. The ability to assess the immediate and lasting influences of the independent variables on the dependent variable is especially advantageous given the theoretical foundations of the model, which would lead us to expect the actions of the state and external actors to have both short- and long-term impacts on conflict intensity.[9] Second, estimating an ECM is appropriate because theories of contentious politics clearly distinguish between dependent and independent variables. The state's repressive and accommodative tactics as well as the actions of external actors are weakly exogenous to conflict intensity. As such, an ECM is proper because it allows for estimating the causal impact of each independent variable on the dependent variable. Finally, an ECM can be used with either stationary or nonstationary data (De Boef and Keele 2008). Even though analysts frequently use ECMs for estimating statistical relationships between two series that are nonstationary and cointegrated, De Boef and Keele (2008) show that ECMs may be used with stationary data as well. To test for stationarity in the variables included in the model, I conduct augmented Dickey-Fuller tests for each variable. The test results indicate that (at the .05 alpha level) violent and nonviolent collective actions, all three types of state repression, as well as *accommodation* and *external support* are all stationary in their levels. Therefore, I conclude that a single ECM is suitable to test the immediate and lasting dynamics of the transition process.

I estimate the following single ECM for the protest wave in Kashmir:[10]

$$\Delta CI = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 CI_{t-1} + \beta_0 \Delta RRepNV_t + \beta_1 RRepNV_{t-1} + \beta_2 \Delta ArNV_t + \beta_3 ArNV_{t-1} +$$

$$\beta_4 \Delta PRepNV_t + \beta_5 PRepNV_{t-1} + \beta_6 \Delta SAccom_t + \beta_7 SAccom_{t-1} +$$

$$\beta_8 \Delta ExtSpt_t + \beta_9 ExtSpt_{t-1} + \beta_{10} Eletions + \varepsilon_t{}^{[11]}$$

where *CI* represents the ratio of violent group collective actions to the total number of group collective actions. *RRepNV, ArNV, PRepNV, SAccom,* and *ExtSpt* correspond to *reactionary repression of nonviolent actions, arrests of nonviolent actors, preventive repression of nonviolent actions, state accommodation,* and *external support* respectively. *Elections* is the dummy variable for election periods.[12] The rate at which the system returns to equilibrium after a change in the independent variables is represented by the ECM adjustment coefficient, α_1. The coefficients β_0, β_2, β_4, β_6, and β_8 refer to the immediate effects of any change in the respective variables at time *t* on the dependent variable. The lasting impacts of *each type of repression of nonviolent actions, state accommodation,* and *external support* are represented by the long-run multiplier for each, which is calculated by dividing the coefficients of each lagged independent variable by the ECM adjustment coefficient.

FINDINGS

Model 1 in table 2 shows the results of the single ECM[13] for the protest wave in Kashmir between 1979 and 1988 when nonviolent actions are repressed.[14] For the short-term effects, *reactionary repression* and *external support* have immediate and highly significant positive effects on *conflict intensity. Arrests of nonviolent actors* also increase *conflict intensity* but at a lower level of significance (p<.05). Contrary to my expectations, *state accommodation and preventive repression* have no significant effects on *conflict intensity* in the short term in Kashmir.[15]

Table 2. Single Error Correction Model on Conflict Intensity in Kashmir (1979-88)

Variable	Model 1	Model 2
Immediate Effects (First Differences)		
Δ Reactionary Repression of Nonviolence $_{(t)}$	.732*** (.074)	-
Δ Arrest of Nonviolent Actors $_{(t)}$	.137* (.066)	-
Δ Preventive Repression of Nonviolence $_{(t)}$	.054 (.063)	-
Δ Reactionary Repression of Violence $_{(t)}$	-	1.337*** (.043)
Δ Arrest of Violent Actors $_{(t)}$	-	.993*** (.063)
Δ Preventive Repression of Violence $_{(t)}$	-	.624*** (.060)
Δ State Accommodation $_{(t)}$	.042 (.115)	-.330** (.095)
Δ External Support $_{(t)}$	1.237*** (.080)	.967*** (.067)
Continuous Effects (Levels)		
Reactionary Repression of Nonviolence $_{(t-1)}$	.802*** (.099)	-
Arrest of Nonviolent Actors $_{(t-1)}$	.212** (.078)	-
Preventive Repression of Nonviolence $_{(t-1)}$	.261** (.081)	-
Reactionary Repression of Violence $_{(t-1)}$	-	1.564*** (.061)
Arrest of Violent Actors $_{(t-1)}$	-	.947*** (.087)
Preventive Repression of Violence $_{(t-1)}$	-	.321*** (.077)
State Accommodation $_{(t-1)}$	.451** (.154)	-.274* (.130)
External Support $_{(t-1)}$	1.130*** (.113)	.938*** (.095)
Conflict Intensity $_{(t-1)}$ (ECM adjustment)	-.727*** (.016)	-.863*** (.016)
Elections $_{(t)}$	-.038 (.089)	-.007 (.072)
Constant	-3.220*** (.075)	-3.880*** (.076)
N	3573	3573
Prob >F	0.000	0.000
Adjusted R^{2}	.41	.61

Notes: *p< .05, **p<.01, ***p<.001; all significance tests are two-tailed; standard errors in parentheses.

    Regarding the longer-term influences, all the variables that have immediate significant effects in the short term have similar effects in their levels. Interestingly, *preventive repression* and *accommodation* increase *conflict intensity* when nonviolent collective action is targeted, instead of decreasing it. These findings show that the fueling effects of *preventive repression* and *accommodation* were observed over the course of several days even though they did not have an immediate effect on *conflict intensity.*

The ECM adjustment coefficient, which estimates the rate at which the system returns to equilibrium after a change in the independent variables, is relatively high (-.73) and is highly significant, indicating that the system returns to equilibrium at a relatively fast rate following a temporary shock. The exact duration of the influence of every significant variable on *conflict intensity* can be computed through the long run multiplier (LRM). The LRM coefficients represent the total effects of their respective variables that are distributed over future time periods. The magnitude of the effect of each variable on *conflict intensity* diminishes at a rate of 73 percent per day until their impact eventually wears off. For instance, the LRM for *reactionary repression* is 1.10.[16] At *t, reactionary repression* will increase *conflict intensity* by .802 units; at *t+1* by .217, at *t+2* by .058, at *t+3* by .016, at *t+4* by .004, and at *t+5* by .001 units. By the sixth day, the effect of *reactionary repression* fades away. Similarly, *external support* and *accommodation* continue to increase *conflict intensity* for five days before their effects wear off at *t+6*. As table 3 shows, the effects of *arrests* and *preventive repression* continue to increase *conflict intensity* until *t+5* when their effects diminish.

Post-estimation simulations for expected values of *conflict intensity* in model 1 further highlight the relative effects of the significant explanatory variables on the dependent variable.[17] The results in table 4 show that among the repression variables, *reactionary repression* of nonviolent collective action has the strongest immediate and lasting effects on *conflict intensity*.[18] The expected value of *conflict intensity* is 3.366 when the change in *reactionary repression* (immediate effect) is at its highest value while all the other independent variables are held constant at their mean values.[19] The longer-term effect of *reactionary repression* is slightly higher, with an expected value of *conflict intensity* of 3.662 when *reactionary repression* is at its highest value at *t-1*.

External support also has high contemporaneous and long-term positive impacts on *conflict intensity*. The expected value for *conflict intensity* is 5.864 when the immediate change in *external support* is at its highest value. This variable's longer-term impact is still strong, with an expected value of 5.318 for *conflict intensity* when it was at its highest value. The total effect (11.177) is higher than the total influence of *reactionary repression* (7.022). Thus, the support the radicals in Kashmir received from Pakistan in terms of sanctuary, training, and arms transfers played a major role in the transition.[20]

The effects of *arrest, preventive repression,* and *state accommodation* are relatively moderate. For instance, the expected value of *conflict intensity* is 0.610 when the change in *arrests* is at its highest value. Its effect is still low in the longer term, as the expected value of *conflict intensity* is at 0.968 when the change in *arrests* is at its highest value.

A striking finding in the analysis is that the dynamics of conflict intensity are different when violent actions were repressed in Kashmir. Model 2 in table 2 shows that all types of repression of violent actions have significant positive short- and long-term effects on *conflict intensity*. *External support* is also significant both in the short and long term when violent acts are repressed. In contrast to model 1, *accommodation* decreases *conflict intensity* both in the short and long term, suggesting that concessions were more effective in reducing the level of *conflict intensity* when the opposition had already switched to violence in Kashmir. Also, the ECM adjustment coefficient is higher in model 2, indicating that the system goes back to equilibrium even faster and that the long-term effects of the significant variables wear off in a shorter time than they do when nonviolent actions are repressed. Most importantly, model 2 shows that groups did not switch to nonviolent tactics as a result of the Indian state's repression of violent tactics. On the contrary, repression of violence significantly fueled the intensity of the Kashmiri conflict as groups continued to resort to violence.[21]

Another interesting finding is the insignificance of elections. While experts generally agree that the controversial State Assembly elections of 1987 had a fueling effect on the conflict in Kashmir (Ganguly 1997; Swami 2007; Schofield 2003), the election variable does not show the expected significant effect. This discrepancy with the literature can most likely

Table 3. Distribution of Continuous Effects on Conflict Intensity based on Model 1.

Variable	ECM Adjst. (α_1)	LRM β / $(-\alpha_1)$	Standard Error	Distribution of Continuous Effects						
				t	$t+1$	$t+2$	$t+3$	$t+4$	$t+5$	$t+6$
Reac. Rep. of $_{(t-1)}$	-.73	1.10	.10	.802	.217	.058	.016	.004	.001	**.000**
Arrest	-.73	.29	.08	.212	.057	.015	.004	.001	**.000**	.000
Prev. Rep. $_{(t-1)}$	-.73	.36	.06	.260	.070	.019	.005	.001	**.000**	.000
State Accom. $_{(t-1)}$	-.73	.62	.15	.451	.122	.033	.009	.002	.001	**.000**
Ext. Support $_{(t-1)}$	-.73	1.55	.11	1.130	.305	.082	.022	.006	.002	**.000**

Table 4. Expected Values of Conflict Intensity based on Model 1.

Type of Effect	Expected Y for Max. Value of X	95% Confidence Interval	Expected Y for Min. Value of X	95% Confidence Interval
Reactionary Repression of Nonviolence				
Immediate	3.366	2.706, 4.068	-3.354	-4.065, -2.711
Longer Term	3.662	2.773, 4.562	-0.020	-0.065, 0.028
Total	7.022	5.577, 8.443	-3.381	-4.095, -2.733
Arrest of Nonviolent Actors				
Immediate	0.610	0.059, 1.187	-0.570	-1.110, -0.039
Longer Term	0.968	0.242, 1.690	-0.003	-0.050, 0.044
Total	1.572	0.494, 2.694	-0.580	-1.122, -0.043
Preventive Repression of Nonviolence				
Longer Term	1.693	0.649, 2.654	-0.009	-0.054, 0.039
Total	1.940	0.447, 3.334	-0.362	-1.189, 0.455
State Accommodation				
Longer Term	1.365	0.427, 2.335	-0.002	-0.048, 0.046
Total	1.494	0.011, 3.036	-0.104	0.282, -0.672
External Support				
Immediate	5.864	5.094, 6.623	-5.851	-6.632, -5.081
Longer Term	5.319	4.305, 6.343	-0.025	-0.072, 0.022
Total	11.177	9.546, 12.836	-5.883	-6.668, -5.109
Baseline Model	0.004	-0.038, 0.049	0.004	-0.038, 0.049

Notes: Expected values of conflict intensity are derived from maximum and minimum values of each independent variable when all others are held at their means, except for the dummy variables. The baseline model is generated with all the independent variables held at their mean values.

be explained by the temporal aggregation of the time series. The data in this analysis are aggregated in daily intervals in an attempt to capture the relatively short-term dynamics. Nonetheless, the controversial elections most likely had longer-term effects on the evolution of the conflict. According to Ganguly (1997), the arrests of hundreds of MUF supporters right before the elections fueled conflict intensity in the following months by contributing to the grievances of the population and strengthening the support base of the radical wing. Such long-term dynamics cannot be captured in this analysis.

Table 5. Evolution of Collective Action during the Protest Wave in Kashmir (1979-88)

Type of Action	Time Period		
	1986	*1987*	*1988*
Nonviolent Strikes	25	22	6
Nonviolent Demonstrations	48	29	28
Violent Strikes	3	9	23
Violent Demonstrations	19	9	34
Clashes	9	36	24
Bombings	4	1	13
Burning houses and villages	3	1	7

Overall, the results of the single ECM and the post-estimation simulations for the expected values of *conflict intensity* indicate that repression of nonviolence, and in particular *reactionary repression* of nonviolence, played a critical role in the transition of the protest wave to an insurgency in Kashmir. The defeat of MUF during the 1987 elections marked the beginning of a major shift toward violent tactics. Once the Islamic wing publicly expressed its secessionist ambitions, any political tension became a basis for protest activity which, quite often, resulted in violence. Unprepared to quell widespread collective action, the police usually tried to contain public demonstrations by resorting to violent crowd-control measures (Patankar 2009). These measures often evoked further violent protests, particularly if people were injured or killed by the police. Therefore, these interactive dynamics between the protesters and the state led to a consistent upward spiraling of the conflict in Kashmir. For instance, in August 1987, a series of deadly clashes between the police and MUF activists took place while the leaders of MUF held a major public meeting in Srinagar urging people to join the struggle to establish an Islamic state (*The Indian Express* 1987). Toward the end of the year, another round of agitation reflected the spiraling dynamics of conflict intensification in the region. In November, Chief Minister Farooq Abdullah announced his intention to stop alternating the state administrative hub annually between Jammu (largely Hindu) and Srinagar (largely Muslim) and to switch to a permanent state administrative presence in Srinagar. This announcement led to a general strike in Jammu, initially organized by the Jammu Bar Association and supported by other influential political organizations. Faced with opposition, Farooq Abdullah reversed his decision. Subsequently, the MUF accused Farooq Abdullah of undermining the interests of Kashmiri Muslims (Ganguly 1997). Public demonstrations soon turned violent, with protesters throwing stones at a police station and the police teargassing and beating up the protesters in response (*The Hindu* 1987).

The second critical aspect of the dynamics in Kashmir is Pakistani support to the radicals in the region. Once tension in Kashmir began to increase in 1987, Pakistan encouraged the JKLF to instigate an offensive struggle against the state (Staniland 2012). From February 1988 on, JKLF militants were trained to use assault rifles and grenades in Pakistani camps (Swami 2007). As these militants returned to Kashmir, the types of attacks organized against the state changed. For instance, as table 5 shows, incidents of bombings and arson increased in 1988 compared to the previous two years. Demonstrations and strikes also turned more violent in 1988 while the frequency of nonviolent forms of collective action declined. Even though my data do not always provide full confirmation that Pakistani-trained militants were indeed the ones who engaged in these violent actions, the strong relationship between external support and the increase in conflict intensity certainly points in that direction. As collective action became more violent, the state's repressive tactics also turned more violent, triggering more violent forms of mobilization and feeding into the spiral of conflict.

In sum, the combination of the Indian state's repressive tactics and Pakistani support strengthened the radical wing and provided favorable conditions for the transition to an insurgency. This causal path is relatively similar to the hypotheses outlined in the theory section, with the exception of the unanticipated fueling effect of preventive repression.

CONCLUSION

The results of the quantitative analyses have several implications for the study of contentious politics. First, the shift to violent tactics under state repression lends support to Lichbach's (1987) argument that the repression of nonviolent protests leads to increased levels of violence. The dynamics in Kashmir show that protesters are more likely to substitute nonviolent tactics with violent ones particularly when directly and indiscriminately repressed by the police. Once the shift to violence happens, the state's repression of violent tactics fuels further violence. Along similar lines, the significant effects of reactionary repression of nonviolent protesters in the longer term supports Opp and Roehl's (1990) micromobilization argument. Even though my data do not provide direct evidence at the individual level for the occurrence of micromobilization processes, the lasting impact of reactionary repression indicates that the radical wing was able to increase its support base and engage in more violent forms of collective action even four to five days after the state repressed nonviolent dissidents. Nonetheless, the group-level data fail to establish specifically that protesters in Kashmir perceived this type of repression as illegitimate and came to realize that violence was a viable option. Interviews or surveys designed to gather information regarding these processes at the individual level would present a more detailed picture regarding the micromobilization processes.

More generally, the Kashmiri case demonstrates that protest waves have the potential to transition to insurgency when contentious dynamics are combined with the fueling effects of a state's direct repression and external support. Both repression and Pakistani support became critical factors for the transition only *after* the contentious dynamics were already in place. Kashmiri people had experienced repression before with the curtailment of civil liberties, electoral malpractice, and intolerance to dissent in the early 1960s (Ganguly 1997). Similarly, Pakistan unsuccessfully attempted to start an armed uprising in Kashmir in 1965 but the locals failed to participate (Ganguly 1997). Thus, it is the combination of repression and external support in the context of existing contention that leads to the transition of a protest wave to an insurgency.

This study reinforces the arguments of Lichbach et al. (2003) and Tarrow (2007) that protest waves and civil wars are intimately linked. By demonstrating how reactionary repression and external support led to the transition from a protest wave to an insurgency, it provides a better understanding of how a protest wave can create its own momentum, triggering a spiral of conflict and eventually transforming into a civil war, as has recently happened in Syria and Libya. Future research needs to focus on additional cases to uncover other factors that might affect the dynamics of such transitions.

Finally, this study provides further empirical evidence for McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly's (2001) claims that similar processes recur in various forms of political contention. In Kashmir, the transition happened as a result of fairly similar combinations of factors across both the protest and insurgency stages. The state repressed the dissidents during the protest wave phase just as it subsequently did during the insurgency phase; and the dissidents used a combination of both nonviolent and violent tactics during both stages of the conflict. More importantly, however, this study confirms that contentious politics is a broader and more encompassing phenomenon than just social movements (Tarrow 2007; Tilly and Tarrow 2007). Expanding the scope of contentious politics to more violent conflicts enables scholars to understand the origins and links between different forms of political opposition.

NOTES

[1] No other major historical events—such as interstate disputes between India, China, or Pakistan—occurred during the time under investigation that can be considered as a rival explanation.

[2] This is a narrower definition than della Porta and Tarrow's (1986) as it includes only nonviolent forms of collective action.

[3] The codebook used for the dataset is available from the author upon request.

[4] From October 15, 1987 until December 3, 1987, *The Indian Express* published no issues. For this time period, *The Hindu* was used as the major news source.

[5] A logit transformation (ln[y/1-y]) is useful when the dependent variable is a proportion and is bounded by 0 and 1, smoothening the variable and fitting it on a real line so that it can be appropriately used in OLS (Papke and Wooldridge 1996). To avoid missing values (due to y = 0 or y = 1), I added .01 to the variable if y = 0 and subtracted .01 if y = 1.

[6] The descriptive statistics for the variables and the overtime patterns of violent and nonviolent collective action, repression, accommodation, and external support are available from the author upon request.

[7] Except for the dummy variables, all the independent variables are logged to reduce the skewness in the variables. A constant value of 1 was added to all daily scores.

[8] For the 1983 and 1987 state assembly elections, the periods between January 1 and April 30 are each coded 1. Ideally, I would control for the interaction between elections and repression as well, since elections can increase state repression if the government chooses to crack down on the opposition in order to remain in power. The distinction between different categories of repression on different types of actions and the aggregation of the events on daily bases leave few observations for each category. Hence, I do not include those interaction variables in the model. When the analysis is run with the interactions of all three types of repression, regardless of the target, they are mostly insignificant.

[9] For a comprehensive discussion of the consequences of restricting the model by taking out the short-term or long-term effects, see DeBoef and Keele (2008).

[10] The lag length is determined by the Akaike information criterion (AIC) scores. In addition, I ran these models by including lags up to seven days (t-7) to make sure that the coefficients for the variables did not have significant and consistent effects at long lags. The analyses with longer lags are available from the author upon request.

[11] This ECM is an ordinary least squares equation.

[12] As accommodation in Kashmir only targeted nonviolent groups, a distinction between targets was not made. The same logic also applies to external support from Pakistan, which only targeted violent actors.

[13] Autocorrelation function and partial autocorrelation function plots indicate that the residuals are not autocorrelated.

[14] Although protests effectively start in 1984, the analysis goes back to 1979 to account for any earlier protest dynamics. Running the ECM for 1984-88 reveals similar results.

[15] Single ECMs with nonviolent mobilization and total mobilization as the dependent variables were also conducted. The analyses suggest that the dynamics of total mobilization are similar to those of conflict intensity, as total mobilization is also driven by reactionary repression, arrests, and external support. Models on nonviolent mobilization suggest that preventive repression has both short- and long-term positive effects on nonviolent mobilization while external support does not. Event count models for robustness checks of violent and total mobilization also largely confirm the main findings of the ECM on conflict intensity. Complete results are available from the author upon request.

[16] The standard errors of the LRMs computed by Bewley transformation indicate that the LRMs are all significant.

[17] These simulations were estimated by CLARIFY: Software for Interpreting and Presenting Statistical Results (Tomz, Wittenberg, and King 2003).

[18] Only the effects of significant coefficients are reported in table 4.

[19] The election dummy variable was held at 0.

[20] Given the systemic underreporting of external support, these results should be treated with caution

[21] The complete results of a single ECM on conflict intensity that includes the repression of both nonviolence and violence are available from the author upon request. While this model mostly confirms the findings of models 1 and 2, *reactionary repression of nonviolence* loses significance in the combined model, possibly due to multicollinearity.

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